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THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SMALL CLAIMS COURTS
IN NEBRASKA
Our judicial system is predicated upon the proposition that all
men are equal before the law.' Recent decisions by the United
States Supreme Court in the realm of criminal prosecutions have
supported this proposition.2 However, while equality has been
the goal of the criminal judicial process, certain inequities of the
civil judicial process still exist. One of these inequities is the
inability of a poor individual to sue for his rightful small claim.3
Seldom does a man of meager means have the financial ability to
hire an attorney 4 to prosecute his case, and to pay the court costs
in his effort to collect a small claim due him. Even if a suit is
instigated, the costs of the suit may exceed the amount of his
recovery.5
The inequities of the present system are equally apparent from
the indigent defendant's point of view. For example, assume the
defendant is sued for ten dollars plus court costs and a reasonable
attorney's fee. If the costs of the suit and the plaintiff's attorney's
fee amount to more than ten dollars, which they invariably will, the
1 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2 See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
s "There are two classes of controversies in particular in which our or-
dinary legal procedure has broken down to such an extent that it may
fairly be said that the result has frequently been a denial of justice:
First, in those cases in which the amount in controversy is small; and
second, those in which one of the parties is so poor that he cannot
afford to wage a legal battle.
"The ordinary procedure has proved too cumbersome as a method
of enforcing small claims. The necessity for written pleadings and a
formal issue reached on those pleadings, and a trial by jury of issues
of fact, necessarily means a considerable expense, an expense which is
entirely disproportionate to the amount involved in the litigation of
small causes." Scott, Small Causes and Poor Litigants, 9 A.B.A.J. 457
(1923). "A third problem is to make adequate provision for petty liti-
gation, to provide for disposing quickly, inexpensively, and justly of
the litigation of the poor, for the collection of debts in a shifting pop-
ulation, and for the great volume of small controversies which a busy,
crowded population, diversified in race and language, necessarily en-
genders. It is here that the administration of justice touches immedi-
ately the greatest number of people." Pound, The Administration of
Justice in the Modern City, 26 HARv. L. REV. 302, 315 (1913).
4 Normally the expense involved in hiring an attorney and prosecuting
the claim is more than the claim involved.
5 But see NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1801 (Reissue 1964), which allows recov-
ery in specific instances for court costs and attorneys' fees in any action
where there is a claim of $1,000.00 or less.
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defendant would be held liable for more than twice the amount
of the debt.6 While it may be argued that the defendant could
halt the suit by payment of the ten dollars, it is also true that he
may have a litigable defense. Can it be said that he should be so
penalized for his right to defend a lawsuit? Thus, in the area of
civil suits for small claims, "equal justice for all" is a hollow phrase.
The most feasible solution which would allow justice for both
plaintiff and defendant in suits for small claims is the establishment
of small claims courts.7 These courts are characterized by their
informal rules of procedure. While substantive law is retained as a
basis for the ultimate decision reached by the small claims court,8
rules of procedure are stated in terms easily understood by laymen
without the advice of legal counsel.9 As one authority in this area
has succinctly and summarily stated: "The essential features of a
small claims court are extremely low costs or none at all, no formal
pleadings, no lawyers, and the direct examination of parties and
witnesses without formality by a trained judge who knows and
applies the substantive law."'1° Any establishment of small claims
courts in Nebraska, however, is dependent upon their proper en-
actment according to the Nebraska constitution.
I. THE NEBRASKA CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
Small claims courts have been established in the United States
by many state legislatures and in the District of Columbia by
Congress.". Each was established within the constitutional man-
6 This is assuming they are allowable under a statute similar to the one
in effect in Nebraska. Supra note 5.
7 See generally Note, 1950 Wis. L. REv. 363; Comment, 52 CALF. L. REv.
876 (1964), for a concise history of small claims courts.
8 "The purpose of the legislation was to secure the prompt and inex-
pensive adjudication of small claims, free from technicalities of pro-
cedural law; that persons unable to employ counsel and not versed in
the law might sue or defend without encountering the delays and
pitfalls which too often distinguish law from justice. In our opinion
Congress did not intend to deprive litigants of their lawful claims or
defenses, or to substitute the abstract conception of justice of an in-
dividual judge for recognized rules of substantive law." Interstate
Bankers Corp. v. Kennedy, 33 A.2d 165, 166 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C.
1943). See also McLaughlin v. Municipal Court, 308 Mass. 397, 32 N.E.
2d 266 (1941); Levins v. Buchholtz, 208 Misc. 597, 145 N.Y.S.2d 79
(Sup. Ct. 1955). Most states by statute declare that the small claims
court is bound by ordinary rules of substantive law. E.g., CAL. CIV.
PRO. CODE § 117(h) (West 1954).
9 Legislation, 34 CoLum. L. Rlv. 932 (1934).
10 R. H. SivuvH, JusTc AND THE POOR 56 (2d ed. 1921).
11 Act of Mar. 5, 1938, ch. 43, 52 Stat. 103.
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date of its respective jurisdiction.
The establishment of small claims courts in Nebraska depends
upon the interpretation of the applicable provision in the Nebraska
constitution. It provides:
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court,
district courts, county courts, justices of the peace, and such other
courts inferior to the supreme court as may be created by law; but
other courts may be substituted by law for justices of the peace
within such districts, and with such additional civil and criminaljurisdiction, as may be provided by law.12
The significant language is the phrase "and such other courts
inferior to the supreme court as may be created by law." The Ne-
braska Supreme Court, while not passing directly on the pre-
cise meaning of the phrase, has ruled that municipal courts may
be established under the authority of that section.13  From this
holding, it can be inferred that any inferior courts created by state
statute are within the constitutional mandate. Such a construc-
tion can also be drawn from a clear reading of the constitutional
language. In further construction of this phrase the Supreme
Court of Nebraska has also stated:
It is true, of course, that the provision as amended empowered the
legislature to create courts other than those designated, inferior to
the supreme court. But such provision does not have the effect of
creating any such courts ipso facto. The provision is in no sense
of the word self-executing; the affirmative action of the legisla-
ture is required to give it effect.14
In light of the foregoing discussion, therefore, it may be con-
cluded that a constitutional amendment is not necessary as a pre-
requisite to the establishment of small claims courts. By proper
statutory enactment the state legislature can constitutionally es-
tablish small claims courts in this state.
The establishment of a small claims court system, however,
must be done with more than a broad enactment of jurisdictional
power to a court. It must contain, in addition, an enactment of
uniform rules as to how the small claims court is to function and
its effect upon other judicial processes.
II. PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED IN ESTABLISHING SMALL
CLAIMS COURTS
If the constitutional power alone is not enough to establish
12 NEB. CONST. art. V, § 1.
'3 Hunter v. Maguire, 136 Neb. 365, 285 N.W. 921 (1939).
14 May v. City of Kearney, 145 Neb. 475, 495, 17 N.W.2d 448, 460 (1945).
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small claims courts, the Nebraska Legislature must enact statutory
authority for such courts. Such enactment, however, will un-
doubtedly raise many questions as to how these courts should
function. To establish successful small claims courts, these ques-
tions must be solved by the statute.
The first and most important consideration in the establish-
ment of small claims courts is the determination of the types of
remedies these courts should grant. Historically small claims courts
have existed only for the recovery of a money judgment.15 This
is necessary to keep the procedure of the court simple, which is
part of its established purpose.
The jurisdictional limit of the amount in controversy must be
carefully determined when enacting a statute establishing small
claims courts. This amount should be large enough to include
most minor claims, and yet small enough to exclude the more
complicated issues involved in a major law suit. The maximum
jurisdictional amount ranges from twenty dollars in one state' 6
to more than 500 dollars in others.'7 The reason for such variance
is that the small claims courts of the various states are not uniform
in purpose. Each system of small claims courts varies according to
its legislative mandate. Therefore, it is up to the state legislature
when enacting small claims courts to set the jurisdictional limits
of that court in accordance with the economy of the state, the
population of the state, and the relative availability of other judi-
cial forums in the state.
To establish a successful and useful small claims court, the
costs of a suit in this court must be kept at a minimum. The costs
of filing the suit in the small claims court is normally from one
dollar to two dollars and fifty cents.'8 Such minimal cost is an
15 Most statutes declare that claims in the small claims courts are to be
suits for "damages." These jurisdictions vary, however, as to whether
this limitation extends to all suits, whether founded on tort or contract.
E.g., Hartman v. Marshall, 131 Colo. 88, 279 P.2d 683 (1955), holding that
"damages" includes only suits in contract; Hopkins v. Parsons, 10 N.J.
Misc. 435, 159 A. 308 (Dist. Ct. 1932), holding that "damages" includes
both suits in tort and contract. The solution to this problem of inter-
pretation is to declare by statute that claims may be brought in the
small claims court on causes of action arising either in contract or in
tort.
16 KAN. GEx. STAT. ANx. § 20-1304 (1964). The Kansas small claims pro-
cedure is criticized in Oglesby & Carr, The Small Claims Court in
Texas, 3 KAN. L. REV. 238 (1955).
17 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 254.04 (1957). This statute is discussed in Note,
1950 Wis. L. REv. 363.
18 Silverstein, Small Claims Courts versus Justices of the Peace, 58 W.
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important consideration in the establishment of a small claims
court procedure if all persons are to avail themselves of the court's
jurisdictional power. Even such minimum costs, however, might
not be justified if a pauper wishes to avail himself of the court's
judicial power. To keep this court open to all persons on an equal
basis, some states have provided that the filing fee be waived if
the plaintiff is a pauper. 9 It should be pointed out, however, that
the existence of low filing fees will undoubtedly eliminate most of
the waiver problems, since most persons with a just claim can
afford a nominal filing fee.
In furtherance of the rule that costs must be kept at a mini-
mum in small claims courts, service of process in the small claims
court is best effectuated by registered mail.20 This method of
service properly apprises the defendant of the claim against him
and keeps the total cost of the suit at a minimum. Ordinarily,
normal state service of process is also permitted upon request by
the plaintiff.
After proper service has been effectuated, states vary on the
answer to the question of whether the defendant can or should be
required to answer the summons. Of the states that assert that
the defendant need not answer, the argument is advanced that such
answering only prolongs and complicates the pleadings in opposi-
tion to the informal purpose of the small claims court.2 ' Other
jurisdictions require the defendant to answer. The procedure most
consistent with the purpose of the small claims court system is to
give the defendant the alternative choice of filing an answer be-
fore hearing date or not to file an answer. Since it is the plaintiff
who initiates the suit in this particular court, as much discretion
as possible should be given to the defendant to adequately defend
his position.
The date for hearing the validity of the claim should be stated
on the summons. Most statutes provide that the hearing be within
a certain number of days after the filing of the suit in the small
VA. L. REV. 241 (1956). But see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 7453
(1965), where the filing fee is $3.00.
19 This idea was suggested by one authority wherein he states "in the
United States, it is submitted that even small claims courts should
have in forma pauperis rules and powers." Maguire, Poverty and Civil
Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV. 361, 398 (1923). Many jurisdictions have
followed such suggestion, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 42.11 (1961).
20 Service of process by registered mail has been upheld as constitutional.
Wise v. Herzog, 114 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
21 Note, 52 CAuF. L. REV. 876 (1964). California does not require the
defendant to answer. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 117 (h) (West 1954).
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claims court.22  This allows speedy adjudication of the claim in
the interest of the plaintiff and prevents harassment of the de-
fendant. The maximum time before a hearing set by statute varies
from state to state and is determined by the probable burden liti-
gants will place upon the court.
Throughout the entire process of a suit in a small claims court
the necessity of a lawyer may be questioned.23  Some states, in
order to keep the procedure of the small claims courts informal,
have expressly excluded attorneys from conducting cases for their
clients in the small claims courts.24 The constitutional provision of
right to counsel not being applicable to civil matters, such legisla-
tive expression is undoubtedly constitutional.25  Such preclusion,
however, may be questioned as being unnecessary as long as at-
torneys are forbidden by statute to hinder the informal speedy
process of the small claims court.
The question of a jury trial has been explicitly eliminated by
other jurisdictions adopting a small claims court procedure. It is
normally declared by statute that the plaintiff waives his right to
a jury trial by bringing suit in the small claims court,26 but the
defendant may get a jury trial if he appeals the small claims court
decision or if he requests one in the small claims court.27
In defending in the small claims court, it must be pointed out
that the defendant should not be deprived of his right to counter-
I2 The time for the hearing varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but
the maximum time is normally set by statute. E.g., FLA. STAT. A-N.
§ 42.10 (1961) (within 5 to 15 days from the date of the service of the
notice); COLO. REV. STAT. ANx. § 127-1-3 (1963) (within 5 to 10 days
from the filing of the plaintiff's petition).
23 See generally Annot., 167 A.L.R. 820 (1947).
24 E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127-1-5 (1963); CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §
117(g) (West 1954); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 1-1508 (1948).
25 In Prudential Ins. Co. v. Small Claims Court, 76 Cal. App. 2d 379, 173
P.2d 38 (Dist. Ct. App. 1946), it is asserted that the prohibition of
counsel is not unconstitutional as depriving the litigant of "due process
of law" since the California act provides for appeal where a trial de
novo with counsel may be had. Thus, if the defendant desires an
attorney he may appeal the small claims court decision and be rep-
resented by counsel in the review proceedings.
26 E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 127-1-6 (1963) (except in certain situa-
tions, e.g., suits for wages or salary earned); CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE §
117(j) (West 1954).
27 CAL. Crv. PRO. CODE § 117(j) (West 1954); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Small
Claims Court, 76 Cal. App. 2d 379, 173 P.2d 38 (Dist. Ct. App. 1946).
MASS. Gm. LAws ANx ch. 218, § 22 (1964); McLaughlin v. Municipal
Court, 308 Mass. 397, 32 N.E.2d 266 (1941). TEx. RE v. Civ. STAT. ANw.
art. 2460 (a) (11) (1964).
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claim or set-off against the plaintiff.28 This may be effectuated by
providing by statute that all other actions concerning the same
transaction shall be settled and pleaded the same as the original
action, provided such claims remain within the jurisdictional limits
of the small claims court.
Since small claims courts are founded upon the principle that
persons should be able to litigate their own small claims in an
informal and inexpensive manner, most jurisdictions provide cer-
tain statutory limitations upon the use of such courts by certain
persons. Some jurisdictions preclude the use of the small claims
court procedure by corporations. 29 These jurisdictions argue that
small claims courts were enacted solely as an aid for individuals of
meager means who are not versed in the law. They allege that
the small claims courts should not be overburdened with suits of
corporations against individuals, since this would contravene the
very purpose of the small claims courts. The validity of these
arguments is questioned, however, by the authorities who have
considered the problem.30 An alternative method allows corpora-
tions as well as individuals to sue in the small claims court, but
limits the number of times per year each corporation or individual
may sue.31 This compromise position would seemingly open the
court to all, yet put an end to any abuse by any one person or
corporation. In further discussion of who may initiate the judicial
process of the small claims court, it should be pointed out that
most states preclude an assignee of a cause of action from suing on
that cause of action in the small claims court.32 This preclusion is
justified upon the basis that small claims courts were enacted to
aid individuals in litigating their own small claims and not to ad-
judicate the causes of action of one buying that right. To allow
an assignee of a cause of action to sue on such cause of action
would violate the fundamental reason for which small claims courts
were founded.
After the hearing of the claim before the small claims court
judge, a decision is rendered by him. This decision raises several
issues as to its ultimate validity. The application of res judicata
28 CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 117(h) (West 1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 39,
§ 659 (Supp. 1966).
29 E.g., Tsx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2460(a) (1964).
80 See R. H. SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 56 (2d ed. 1921).
31 N.H. Laws c. 179 § 5 (1939). Repealed in 1955, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 503:5 (Supp. 1965).
32 E.g., CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 117(f) (West 1954); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 2460 (a) (1964). Merchants Serv. Co. v. Small Claims Court,
35 Cal.2d 109, 216 P.2d 846 (1950).
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to the judgment rendered in the small claims court may affect
further litigation between the two parties. Upon sound legal prin-
ciples the res judicata affect of the small claims court should be
severely limited. Because of the limited judicial process which is
characteristic of the small claims court, the res judicata affect of
the small claims court judgment must be limited to the amount in
controversy. No other issues should be held to be res judicata in
other legal actions between the two parties. Just as the res judi-
cata affect of a small claims court decision must be limited in its
application, so too the review of a small claims court decision
must be limited. Most jurisdictions hold that the small claims
court's decision is binding upon the plaintiff since it is he who first
initiated the suit in this particular court.3 3  As to the defendant,
however, all jurisdictions assert that he has the right to appeal a
judgment against him.3 4
III. PROBLEMS PARTICULAR TO THE ADOPTING OF
SMALL CLAIMS COURTS IN NEBRASKA
Among the problems to be solved before enacting a system of
small claims courts in Nebraska, none are more important than
determining in what localities these courts are to be set up, and
determining the means of selection of the judges to preside over
them. In the larger cities of the state such courts could be set up
as branches of the municipal courts. In the smaller cities and
counties, however, such courts would have to be set up as branches
of the state courts. In the larger cities the judges may be selected
as full-time judges of the small claims courts, whereas in the
smaller counties the state judge would have to be allowed by
statute to sit as a part-time small claims court judge also. In
either situation, however, compensation must be fixed by statute
and must not be dependent upon the fees paid into the court.
In the enactment of this type of court, a decision must also
be made as to whether these courts are to have exclusive jurisdic-
tion of small claims or are to have concurrent jurisdiction with
the other established courts of the state. Most jurisdictions regard
a suit in the small claims court as an alternative to a suit in an-
other state court. This approval of concurrent jurisdiction by the
other jurisdictions and by the authorities in the area, lend force
33 E.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 117(j) (West 1954); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 218, § 23 (1964). But see TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2460 (a) (12)
(1964) which states that either party may appeal if the amount in
controversy is over $20.00.
34 E.g., CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 117(i) (West 1954); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 127-1-6 (1963).
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to the argument that these courts should be available to those who
do not want to or who for purely financial reasons cannot initiate
a suit in one of the other already established state courts.
IV. CONCLUSION
Small claims courts are founded upon the principle that all
persons are entitled to court adjudication of their just small claims.
To ensure their successful operation, however, the establishment of
these courts must follow exhaustive consideration by the enacting
authority of the ways these courts are to operate. This article, it
is hoped, will serve to generate interest and thought for future
legislative action in this area.
Stephen G. Olson, '66
